

# Log

WINTER/SPRING 2013

Observations on  
architecture and the  
contemporary city

46° 33' N, 15° 39' E

Maribor, Slovenia, 2069. Speculative urban-future projects typically are compelled toward the race of progress and prediction, but the central park spanning the Drava River is a paradoxically anachronistic provocation. After 57 years, the project – a simple stitch between the river's north and south banks – is fully mature, a carpet of vegetation filling in the twisting curlicues of the flesh-structure grafted onto the old city. This gesture of pure density should hope to prevail as long as the world's oldest living vine, Maribor's more than 500-year-old Žametovka, the grapes of which produce a still undrinkable sweet wine.

# 27

\$15.00





# Urban Project as Thought Experiment

## 1. URBANISME MAUDIT?

In the history of city planning, a significant number of projects could be called utopian. Generally detached from reality, these utopias, with their utmost concern for the welfare of human society, were conceived as devices for improving citizens' lives. Thus many utopias were proposed in the ages of enlightenment – in 18th-century neoclassicism and early 20th-century high modernism.

Whereas a significant number of architectural works could be called, in the words of historian Anthony Vidler, uncanny, city planning has scarcely been so. Rather, it is always associated with the notion of goodness. This has not, however, prevented city planning from being harshly criticized as producing oppressive dystopias. Le Corbusier's Contemporary City for Three Million Inhabitants, which contained nothing uncanny in terms of architectural representation, was criticized even by some of his admirers as being too monotonous, homogenous, and devoid of the human "touch" of life. And the enemies of modern city planning saw it as responsible for the destruction of Western cities once full of humanity and dignity. The metaphysics of Le Corbusier's regularity and pure geometry, in both his architectural work and urban projects, was seen in vastly different ways. Even if his buildings were too unfamiliar for the conservative sensibilities of his time, no one would have ever condemned them as evil, or compared them to fascist crimes, as some vehement opponents of modern city planning have done today in sensational Web pages.

This criticism partly reflects the fact that the gap between the "normal" and the "new" is more radical and far-reaching in the field of city planning than it is in architectural design, which ultimately produces nothing more than single and negligible objects. People do not have much difficulty in finding ways to judge the appropriateness of cities based on their own past experiences. However, is there an absolute norm to distinguish between good and evil?



## 2. DELIRIOUS ASIA

It is not unusual today to see huge demographic influxes in the major cities of developing countries, previously generic – and idyllic – cities that are metamorphosing into the frenzy of megalopolises. This is often called overurbanization. Especially in Asia, cities are changing at a speed once inconceivable. In China, for example, there are dozens of cities whose names are unfamiliar to foreigners – not only to Westerners but also to its neighbors, like the Japanese – yet whose populations surpass that of smaller European countries like Switzerland and Denmark. Many of these cities are the product of only a few decades – instant megalopolises.

Paul Virilio, the urbanist and author of *Vitesse et Politique* (Speed and Politics, 1977) who theorized the idea of *dromologie*, the regime of speed that, in its acceleration, drives systems of nations, societies, and organizations, may not have anticipated such new Asian urbanism. He argues that the belief that the accelerating speed of technological progress creates happiness for humankind is a 19th-century idea, and that the idea of absolute speed in the late 20th century is associated with the idea of power.

Virilio's critique could also be applied to the actual state of East Asian megalopolises, which are dominated by the combination of a totalitarian regime and ruthless speculation, summed up in a well-known slogan by Deng Xiaoping, who triggered the capitalist market economy in China: "To get rich is glorious." In effect, the power driving these cities is much more perverse than the French philosopher's visions, which were cultivated in the illuminist context of the West.

Recently the *Economist Intelligence Unit* reported that China will see its number of megalopolises grow from three in 2000 to 13 in 2020. In spite of the near halt in population growth in the whole of China because of falling fertility rates, "the populations of these megalopolises have still risen sharply in recent years. The national population growth rate averaged just 0.57% a year over 2000–10, but in that period the metropolitan population of greater Zhenzhou grew by an average of 9.4% a year, more than doubling in size over the decade. The same trend was evident in Chang-Zhu-Tan, which saw its population more than double from 3.7m. to 8.3m. over the same period."<sup>1</sup> These cities are never new towns at all. Zhenzhou, for example, one of the eight great ancient capitals, is a 3,500-year-old city, but it is quite new as well; since 2000, Zhenzhou has built a new town center, designed by the former metabolist architect Kisho Kurokawa, for

1. *Economist Intelligence Unit*, "Supersized Cities: China's 13 Megalopolises," July 26, 2012. <http://www.pdfmagazines.org/magazines/19841-the-economist-intelligence-unit-supersized-cities-chinas-13-megalopolises-2012.html>.



ge demographic influxes in  
countries, previously generic  
tamorphosing into the  
often called overurbaniza-  
e changing at a speed once  
mple, there are dozens of  
r to foreigners – not only to  
ors, like the Japanese – yet  
f smaller European countries  
Many of these cities are the  
instant megalopolises.  
d author of *Vitesse et Politique*  
heorized the idea of *dromolo-*  
ts acceleration, drives sys-  
ganizations, may not have  
nism. He argues that the  
of technological progress  
l is a 19th-century idea, and  
the late 20th century is as-

e applied to the actual state  
ch are dominated by the  
ime and ruthless specula-  
n slogan by Deng Xiaoping,  
et economy in China: "To  
e power driving these cities  
French philosopher's visions,  
minist context of the West.  
*ligence Unit* reported that  
galopolises grow from three  
the near halt in population  
ecause of falling fertility  
megalopolises have still risen  
ional population growth rate  
2000–10, but in that period  
greater Zhenzhou grew by  
than doubling in size over  
evident in Chang-Zhu-Tan,  
an double from 3.7m. to 8.3m.  
ties are never new towns at  
of the eight great ancient  
but it is quite new as well;  
a new town center, designed  
ct Kisho Kurokawa, for

more than one million people. After Kurokawa's death, his rival Arata Isozaki joined the project.

Korea is also developing its cities. In Seoul, French anthropologist Valérie Gelézeau was surprised to find extremely enlarged – especially in the vertical dimension – grand ensembles: residential skyscrapers scattered throughout the newly developed southern area of the Korean capital. The same can be seen in other large Korean cities like Busan. These gigantic radiant cities can be recognized from an airplane or in Google Earth images. The anti-Corbusians would identify them as huge tombstones, but they are hailed by Koreans. Unlike the response to the grand ensembles built in France, which are abhorred by their citizens, living "in the air" is a symbol of social status for Koreans. In her book *Séoul, ville géante, cités radieuses* (Seoul, Giant City, Radiant City, 2003), Gelézeau calls the Korean grand ensembles a radiant city without ideology. She writes that the builders of these housing complexes do not know the work of Le Corbusier, and that the Korean architects she interviewed said these new towns are the task of developers, never of architects.

An interesting comparison of European and Asian cities was posed in the 2002 exhibition, Vienna-Hong Kong: Learning From Antipodes. While Hong Kong is a city of skyscrapers, the urban profile of Vienna is fundamentally unchanged from the end of the Hapsburg Empire in the late 18th century. While Vienna is filled with architectural masterpieces by Fischer von Erlach, Otto Wagner, Adolf Loos, Hans Hollein, and Coop Himmelb(l)au, which represent various historical periods and styles, what is missing in Hong Kong "is the participation of architectural design as a cultural discourse. Even the two showpiece towers from Norman Foster (HSBC Bank) and I.M. Pei (Bank of China), completed just before the handover of 1997, were overwhelmed by postcolonial readings rather than an intellectual contest in the eyes of the locals."<sup>2</sup> Additionally, "There is no evident will to city building in Hong Kong. Rather, the form of the city is more of a by-product of immigration and economic activity. This means that any production of social space in the city is accidental and has little to do with architectural principles of form or imagination. . . . Nevertheless, almost every visitor to Hong Kong leaves with deep impressions of a lively, vibrating, fascinating big city."<sup>3</sup> Unlike Vienna, where the urban tissue is composed by the counterpoint of

2. MAP Office, ed., *Vienna-Hong Kong: Learning from Antipodes* (Hong Kong: MAP Book Publishers, 2003), 16.

3. *Ibid.*, 23.



architectural masterpieces (even if sometimes hostile to tradition), the excitement of Hong Kong, a delirious megalopolis, is never castrated by the absence of architectural culture. This is a fantastic counterexample to the classic principle of Camillo Sitte, who believed that excellent buildings form a prominent townscape.

Citizens of great Asian cities who know nothing of Le Corbusier would certainly take for granted his provocative statement that the skyscrapers of Manhattan are too small. For them, megalomaniacal Manhattanism is not a surprise, but a commonplace.

### 3. GLOBAL DIASPORA AND CITIES OF EXCEPTION

The most pressing problem of this Asian phenomenon, however, is not the excitement these generic cities create. Today's social circumstances and future prospects do not allow us to indulge in the hedonistic charms of these post-modern – if we can call them such – megalopolises; how, if the domestic migration to large cities is accelerated, and if this overurbanization is not accompanied by a corresponding growth in economic development, will these populations be fed? As a consequence of an imbalance between demographic expansion and economic development, there would be a population surplus within the national border and the extra growth would be forced to emigrate.

When Le Corbusier conceived of his city for three million, the world population was (only) two billion. When Kenzo Tange designed his Tokyo Plan 1960, which Rem Koolhaas said, “stuns in the way an entirely new doctrine seems immediately convincing,” the population had reached three billion. Today, 50 years after Tokyo Plan 1960, it has reached seven billion and is still expanding. It is said that we will add another two to three billion people (or the entire world population during the lifetimes of Le Corbusier and Tange) before the mid-21st century. This is beyond the limits of unchecked economic and population growth first estimated by Donella Meadows et al in the celebrated report, *The Limits to Growth*, in 1972.

French demographer Emmanuel Todd points out that this population explosion is an outcome of the rise in literacy in developing countries. This has led to the diffusion of the idea of public health, which has dramatically reduced the death rate, especially of small children. Improved public health is also the basis for future modernization and industrialization. Until modernization is achieved, there will



sometimes hostile to  
Kong, a delirious mega-  
presence of architectural  
example to the classic  
ieved that excellent  
cape.

who know nothing of Le  
granted his provocative  
Manhattan are too small.  
ttanism is not a surprise,

EXCEPTION  
Asian phenomenon,  
se generic cities create.  
uture prospects do not  
ic charms of these post-  
– megalopolises; how, if  
ies is accelerated, and if  
panied by a correspond-  
nt, will these populations  
alance between demo-  
evelopment, there would  
national border and the  
migrate.

of his city for three mil-  
ly) two billion. When  
an 1960, which Rem  
an entirely new doctrine  
e population had reached  
Tokyo Plan 1960, it has  
panding. It is said that  
llion people (or the en-  
etimes of Le Corbusier  
tury. This is beyond the  
population growth first  
in the celebrated report,

el Todd points out that  
ome of the rise in literacy  
d to the diffusion of the  
matically reduced the  
ren. Improved public  
modernization and in-  
n is achieved, there will

inevitably be an imbalance between the birthrate and the  
maintenance of the family within the framework of a do-  
mestic economy.

On the other hand, cities in developed countries, which  
used to be the driving forces of the expansion of urban areas,  
are now confronting stagnation and even decay, as seen in the  
new paradigm of shrinking cities. These changes will inevita-  
bly bring about a huge demographic shift across the globe.  
I call this total mobilization, or the Global Diaspora.

The Global Diaspora is also an outcome of the global-  
ization of the world economy, accelerated by the expansion  
of virtual finances. While the mobilization of enormous  
amounts of virtual money in the speculative economy is  
not accompanied by a concentrated demand for real space,  
the mobilization of the global population cannot be easily  
slowed down, even by such events as the collapse of the US  
subprime mortgage market or the bankruptcy of Lehman  
Brothers, which ultimately brought about temporary eco-  
nomic stagnation.

Despite real resistance to the influx of foreign popula-  
tions in developed countries in Europe, which are now suf-  
fering from a serious economic recession, the demographic  
tsunami will never stop. It will drastically alter the estab-  
lished order and its traditional values. It is ridiculous to  
believe that previous urban norms – like human scale and a  
classical sense of community – for the city, when the world  
population was less than two or three billion, can be main-  
tained. The surge in population will generate unprecedented  
demands on cities, producing conditions far more dense and  
critical than what Koolhaas called the culture of congestion.  
This can be called a state of exception (*Ausnahmezustand*), a  
term used by German jurist and philosopher Carl Schmidt  
in his *Politische Theologie* (1922), and recently developed by  
Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben in his *Stato di  
Eccezione* (State of Exception, 2003), and that now reflects  
societies of exception as a normative condition.

That architecture proved its impotence in the face of  
rapid urbanization and its overwhelming and proliferating  
quantity is only a small issue among the many facing these  
exceptional cities. When another two to three billion people  
are loaded onto the globe and mobilized, the issues pre-  
sented by Seoul and Hong Kong today will appear not as a  
radical new phenomenon, but as an idyllic past.

Overurbanization has been criticized as a thought-  
less obsession with development, resulting in ecological and



other environmental disasters. This is seen by many as an evil urbanization, the opposite of the current paradigm of city planning based on the historic, enlightened ideas of human settlements. This criticism might hold some truth, but if this state of exception, this globalized overurbanization, is now becoming a normal state, how can it be stopped? To believe that overurbanization is no more than a temporary deviation, and that these cities will reach the more matured (and "normal") state of Western cities, is a mistaken understanding of the situation; the normal and the exceptional seem to be conflating in the current global situation.

There is another factor driving the coming Global Diaspora. The crisis is not limited to developing countries where domestic migration to the cities is creating huge slums, but will also be felt in developed countries that are suffering from decreasing birth rates and aging populations, like Japan, Korea, Germany, and Italy. China will join this list before long. Japan especially is experiencing a rapidly aging society, with 23 percent of the country's population over 65, by far the highest in the world. Retirees constitute 19 percent of the population in Italy, 18 percent in Germany, 16 percent in France, 15 percent in the UK, and 12 percent in the US. The working population in the 15–64 age group in Japan is rapidly decreasing from its peak of 87 million in 1995; it is expected to fall to 52 million by 2050. Future generations will suffer from a decrease in the productive capacity of the national population and an increase in social security payments to support older generations. From 2000 to 2020, the number of workers supporting each retired person will fall from four to two. Disproportionate age demographics are now among the most seriously debated social problems in Japan.

Given these circumstances, one of Japan's major problems is how to continue to maintain its society in the future. If secondary industries in Japan continue to outsource work to countries where cheap labor is available, and if their headquarters functions are also transferred out of the country, revenue from corporate taxes will be lost. The only two feasible options are either to attract back the secondary industries in one way or another, or to expand the tertiary industries to take the place of the lost secondary industries. In either case it will be extremely difficult to find solutions only within the country. One possible step is to accept immigrant populations. As architects we should try to envision possibilities for the city under such new circumstances.



This is seen by many as an of the current paradigm of eric, enlightened ideas of hu- might hold some truth, but obalized overurbanization, how can it be stopped? To no more than a temporary will reach the more matured n cities, is a mistaken under- rmal and the exceptional ent global situation.

ing the coming Global d to developing countries cities is creating huge slums, countries that are suffer- nd aging populations, like y. China will join this list perienicing a rapidly aging ntry's population over 65, etirees constitute 19 percent ent in Germany, 16 percent nd 12 percent in the US. i-64 age group in Japan is of 87 million in 1995; it is 050. Future generations productive capacity of crease in social security tions. From 2000 to 2020, g each retired person will onate age demographics y debated social problems

e of Japan's major problems society in the future. If inue to outsource work vailable, and if their nsferred out of the coun- will be lost. The only ttract back the secondary r to expand the tertiary ost secondary industries. ifficult to find solutions ble step is to accept im- we should try to envision new circumstances.

#### 4. THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: AN ALTERNATIVE TO UTOPIA

*If today writing about utopias is a sign of spiritual desolation, then planning them must be a criminal act.* – Cedric Price, 1972

As a society – and as architects – we have become too accus- tomed to the idea of a right solution. This is an excessively optimistic and almost utopian idea in itself, particularly in this state of exception. Given this unprecedented situation, it is necessary to propose possible extreme conditions rather than ideal and idyllic conditions. This leads to the project as thought experiment.

A thought experiment, widely known under the German term *Gedankenexperiment*, is the consideration of a “hypothesis, theory, or principle for the purpose of thinking through its consequences.”<sup>4</sup> The structure of the experiment may or may not be possible to perform; in fact, there may be no need to perform the experiment in question.

One of the optimal fields for conducting thought experiments is science fiction. The genre depicts extreme fictional situations that allow us to work out what could happen in states of exception. Here the thought experiment ranges from future technology to cosmic anthropology to politics, with two clearly definable aspects: utopian and dystopian. Among the latter is the work of J.G. Ballard, author of *Crash* (1973), *Concrete Island* (1974), *High Rise* (1975) and, later, *Cocaine Nights* (1996) and *Super-Cannes* (2000). Ballard himself called his work thought experiments. His scenarios depict perverse images of technological landscapes or hyper neoliberalism, and are far from being reformist narratives on the state of things.

Another science fiction author who produced work as thought experiments was Komatsu Sakyō, who was personally very close with his metabolist contemporaries in architecture. His best-known work, *Japan Sinks* (1973), depicts an apocalyptic disaster in which the entire Japanese archipelago has sunk into the ocean after a series of huge earthquakes. The disaster (as thought experiment) was a way to put the problematic identity of the nation into question. Thirty-three years later, the aging novelist, who had lost the energy to complete a long work, published the second part of *Japan Sinks* with the assistance of a fellow writer. This is the story of Japanese scattered throughout the world (another kind of Global Diaspora) after they had lost their home country. After several decades, they organize enormous fleets of megaflots from all over the world in order

<sup>4</sup>. See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thought\\_experiment](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thought_experiment).



to meet in the area of the sea where their home islands once stood. It is highly possible that Komatsu was influenced by his friend Kiyonori Kikutake's series of marine cities projects. (After the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station accident in 2011, megafloats were actually used as temporary reservoirs of polluted waters.)

The vision of the city in a state of exception in the coming Global Diaspora can be called a thought experiment in city planning, and as such, it is far from being a reformist righting of things.

#### 5. TOKYO PLAN 2010

Tokyo Plan 2010 is conceived and planned as a half-century-later version of, and indirect homage to, Kenzo Tange's Tokyo Plan 1960. Like 1960, the proposal for 2010 notes when the idea was conceived, not the period for which the plan is intended. Tokyo Plan 2010 assumes the time of its plan is sometime around the year 2050.

The new proposal reflects a half-century of differences. Tokyo 2010 assumes a completely different urban setting from what the 1960 plan assumed for a population density imagined only in domestic terms. The 1960 plan aimed for an ideal – or utopian – mode, while Tokyo 2010 is a plan as thought experiment developed for the Global Diaspora situation.

In this vision, the Tokyo of 2050, after admitting many immigrants of the Diaspora population, will come to surpass present-day Hong Kong in density. Consequently, it is designed as a Hyper den-City, a city of extremely high density. This condition requires planning categories beyond all traditional architectural approaches. Tokyo Plan 2010 builds upon typologies developed by the former Metabolists – such as Fumihiko Maki's Golgi structure, Kiyonori Kikutake's Tower Shaped Community, and Arata Isozaki's City-in-the-Air projects – modified with a much expanded scale: Hyper den-City building types.

Hyper den-City lies beyond the concepts of good and evil. It is not a "correct" city form, not a comfortable city, a humanitarian city, a beautiful city, or anything of the sort. In this sense, Hyper den-City is not even a goal we should aim for, just a hypothetical vision carried to the extreme – a thought experiment. Mike Davis, author of *Evil Paradises* (2007), might call this city planning for evil, but in the state of exception this evil megalopolis exists only as a hypothesis; we cannot strive toward its realization.



re their home islands once  
omatsu was influenced by  
ries of marine cities proj-  
chi Nuclear Power Station  
actually used as temporary

ate of exception in the com-  
a thought experiment in  
ar from being a reformist

planned as a half-century-  
nage to, Kenzo Tange's  
proposal for 2010 notes  
t the period for which the  
0 assumes the time of its  
r 2050.

half-century of differences.  
y different urban setting  
d for a population density  
s. The 1960 plan aimed for  
hile Tokyo 2010 is a plan  
d for the Global Diaspora

2050, after admitting many  
ulation, will come to surpass  
ity. Consequently, it is de-  
y of extremely high den-  
nning categories beyond all  
ches. Tokyo Plan 2010 builds  
e former Metabolists – such  
ure, Kiyonori Kikutake's  
Arata Isozaki's City-in-the-  
much expanded scale: Hyper

the concepts of good and  
m, not a comfortable city,  
city, or anything of the sort.  
not even a goal we should  
n carried to the extreme – a  
s, author of *Evil Paradises*  
ing for evil, but in the state  
s exists only as a hypothesis;  
ization.

Despite predictions that the national population of Japan will decline, Tokyo Plan 2010 is planned for 10 million inhabitants, both domestic and foreign (the 1960 plan was for a city of five million), because a large increase in the admission of foreign immigrants will be needed to sustain society's activities. As the Japanese population ages and its ratio to the working population becomes problematic, accepting both white- and blue-collar foreign workers in Japan, as happened in Singapore, will be inevitable. The majority of those immigrants will likely be concentrated in Tokyo, making increased density inevitable. Tokyo's growing sprawl has already reached the allowable limits for commuting from the suburbs to the city center. To accommodate the bursting population of Tokyo will thus require not an explosion directed outside of the city but an implosion directed within.

#### 6. BAY AREA LINEAR MEGALOPOLIS


Tokyo Plan 2010 is located in the Tokyo Bay Area and proposes an urban environment that is completely different from that of the inner city – historic ties are weak, districts are large, and land ownership is not excessively subdivided.

Unlike Tange's 1960 proposal, the new plan is not for an island (except for industrial complexes of megafloats) but for a linear city along the Tokyo coastline stretching 30 kilometers along the bay, and literally dividing the city into north and south. This linear megalopolis, like the north coast of Hong Kong Island, is a network of communities connected by a ring-shaped transportation infrastructure circling the bay. It is an attempt to conceive a compact megacity that contains a chainlike connection of three independent zones, each different in nature, while guaranteeing maximum mobility.

In dividing north and south, this huge immigrant megalopolis symbolizes the inner contradictions of the world. Admitting immigrants is an issue that cannot be simply whitewashed; it will give rise to urban social disparities, which will mean having to accept the accompanying social and environmental problems.

Strong contrast is present, for example, between the Central City and its Hyper-Intelligent & Finance City (HIC), the neighboring Casino City, and the South City. The Central City, like Ballard's *Super-Cannes* (or present-day Dubai), is a city for the international business elite, a city of vanity representing a perverse neoliberalism and an obscene





YATSUKA LAB, SHIBAURA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, TOKYO, BACK-UP CITY, 2011. RENDERING. A SUPPLEMENTARY PROJECT FOR TOKYO PLAN 2010, BACK-UP CITY IS CONCEIVED AS MEGAFLOATS HOUSING MEDICAL BASES THAT CAN TRANSFORM TO RECEIVE REFUGEES.


contrast to the temporary laborers' town of the South City – a Sodom and Gomorrah for the year 2050.

The South City, an industrial zone spreading south of Chiba, the setting of William Gibson's *Neuromancer* (1984), is a Global Village centered on the mainly immigrant population of factory workers housed in temporary mobile units delivered by ship and assembled on site. It is a three-dimensional cyberpunk slum, formed like puzzle pieces within the framework of the shipping/transportation system.

This city is another Tokyo, a foreign zone in the nation and a sort of gated megalopolis outside of passport control, not unlike the Special Economic Zones in China, India, and Singapore that cater to foreign investment. In Japan the historical precedent is Dejima, the fan-shaped tiny artificial island built in Nagasaki Bay, which was the only place where trade with foreign countries was permitted by the isolationist policy of the Edo period. The location is justified because the bay area, especially in Tokyo, which is a product of long-term reclamation since the Edo period, is a front for the city's urbanization. Even today, the Tokyo Bay area is a locus of the cities of velocity. They are megalopolitan.

Jean Gottman, who advocated the idea of the megalopolis, did not understand one aspect of Hyper den-City. His idea of megalopolis, applied to the northeast coast of the US, was a horizontal conurbation from Boston to Washington, DC, that exploded outward toward the suburbs around central cities of the region, whereas the hypothesis of Tokyo 2010





ers' town of the South City –  
e year 2050.

ial zone spreading south of  
ibson's *Neuromancer* (1984),  
the mainly immigrant popu-  
ed in temporary mobile units  
d on site. It is a three-dimen-  
-like puzzle pieces within the  
nsportation system.

a foreign zone in the nation  
outside of passport control,  
c Zones in China, India, and  
investment. In Japan the  
the fan-shaped tiny artifi-  
y, which was the only place  
ries was permitted by the  
riod. The location is justified  
in Tokyo, which is a product  
the Edo period, is a front for  
oday, the Tokyo Bay area is a  
hey are megalopolitan.

ed the idea of the megalopolis,  
f Hyper den-City. His idea  
ortheast coast of the US, was  
Boston to Washington, DC,  
the suburbs around central  
hypothesis of Tokyo 2010

Log 27

is of an implosion under the hyper pressure of the grow-  
ing population. This implosion will generate a critical point  
at which the conventional paradigms of city planning will  
finally be nullified and metamorphosized. This operation  
presents a vision of the megalopolis that might be far from  
the idealized image, but is possible, if quite extreme, and  
thus worth being examined. What other significance should  
we expect from the act of planning the cities confronting  
our exceptional circumstance?

HAJIME YATSIKA, AN ARCHITECT AND  
CRITIC, IS A PROFESSOR AT SHIBAURA  
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY IN TOKYO.

41